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ADDENDUM: TAFT-HARTLEY AND STATE POWER TO
REGULATE LABOR RELATIONS
DONALD H. WOLLETr*
The article on this subject which appeared in the February, 1955 issue
of the Washington Law Review' made reference to three cases which were
then pending before the Supreme Court of the United States. Since that
time the Court has handed down these decisions. Ordinarily this would not
justify additional comment, for one of the risks in writing any article in such
a dynamic field is that what appears to be current today may be rendered
obsolete or incomplete tomorrow. However, since the subject matter is of
continuing and developing importance to all lawyers interested in labor law,
and since at least one of the predictions made as to the Court's possible
behavior apparently turned out to be more venturesome than accurate, it
seems appropriate to set forth these decisions.
Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.'
The case involved the following situation. The Machinists Union
represented the machinists employed by a large St. Louis brewery.
At a time when the contract was properly open for renegotiation, the
Machinists went on strike in order to get the brewing company to agree
that when it had need to expand its plant it would do business solely
with building contractors who had entered into agreements whereby
certain work would be done by members of the Machinists Union
rather than by members of the Carpenters Union. The National Labor
Relations Board dismissed the employer's charge that the Machinists'
conduct violated section 8(b)(4)(D) of the Taft-Hartley Act,
which prohibits jurisdictional-dispute strikes. However, the Board
did not rule on the question of whether the strike constituted an illegal
secondary boycott under sections 8 (b) (4) (A) or (B) of the federal
Act because that issue was not presented to it.
In the meantime the company, after it had filed the charge with the
Board but before the Board had acted upon it, initiated state court
proceedings against the strike on the grounds, inter alia, that it con-
stituted a secondary boycott in violation both of Missouri common law
and sections 8(b) (4) (A) and (B) of the Taft-Hartley Act. More
than a year after the Board dismissed the company's charge, the Mis-
souri Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's injunction against the
* Professor of Law, University of Washington.
130 WAsa. L. REv. 1-25 (1955).
2348 U.S. 468 (1955).
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strike on the ground that it constituted an illegal conspiracy in restraint
of trade under a Missouri statute. In its opinion the Missouri court
treated the Board's dismissal of the employer's charge as a holding
that the allegation upon which the injunction issued could not be the
basis of an unfair labor practice under the Taft-Hartley Act.
It was this decision which the United States Supreme Court reversed
on writ of certiorari. The Court's opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter
lays emphasis on the exclusive primary jurisdiction of the National
Labor Relations Board.
It points out that the Board's dismissal of the employer's charge did
not amount to a determination that the strike was not violative of
Taft-Hartley in any respects. The Board's action meant only that the
strike did not violate section 8 (b) (4) (D), leaving open the question
of whether it constituted an illegal secondary boycott under sections
8(b)(4) (A) or (B). This open question is one which the Board,
not the state court, is empowered to pass upon in the first instance.
The state court could not, in advance of some Board action on this
question, adjudge the controversy and extend its own form of relief.
As in Garner v. Teamsters,3 the 1953 decision holding that where
the conduct at issue falls within the prohibitions of the federal Act
the NLRB has exclusive primary jurisdiction to pass on it, the Court
is concerned with preserving the integrity of the centralized federal
administrative procedure which Congress thought necessary for the
uniform application of the statute's substantive rules so as to avoid
local diversities and conflicts which might otherwise result.- The
Garner opinion emphasized that it is the similarity of remedies,
intended to prevent unfair labor practices and brought to bear on
precisely the same conduct, that creates the danger of conflict and
causes state jurisdiction to fail.
It follows, as the Court subsequently held in Construction Workers
v. Laburnum,' that a state may hear and determine the issues in a
common law tort action for recovery of damages caused by a union's
violent conduct which is also a federal unfair labor practice, where
the state remedy has no parallel in federal law.
3346 U.S. 485 (1953).
4"The emphasis .:. is upon the primary jurisdiction of the Federal Board, i.e., that
when a federal question is, or even may be, involved, and Congress has set up a special-
ized agency to deal with it, then it is the legislative intent that such agency should get
first crack at the problem, thereby permitting a uniform policy to be developed at the
national level in interstate commerce, applicable throughout the country by whatever
court or agency may seek to enforce it." Forkosch, Jurisdiction and Its Impact on State
Powers, 16 Oio STATE L. J. 301, 334.
5347 U.S. 656 (1954).
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Since the Laburnum case was inapposite, the plaintiff argued in
the Weber case that the Garner doctrine was distinguishable on
another ground-viz., that the state was attempting to prevent restraints
of trade rather than to regulate labor relations as such. The Court
answered that it is immaterial "just what category of 'public policy'
the union's conduct allegedly violated."8 Such a broad formulation
raises a question as to state power to reach by a remedy similar to
the one afforded by the Taft-Hartley Act any union conduct which
reasonably falls within the prohibitions of that statute, no matter
what the basis for the state relief.
Thus, it may be offered as an explanation for the Court's subse-
quent denial of certiorari in Mahoney v. Sailors' Union of the Pacific,'
in which the Washington court held that it did not have jurisdiction
to award back wages to an employee whose wrongful expulsion from
a union led to his exclusion from employment where it appeared that
he might have obtained such relief from the NLRB.
It throws doubt on the power of the Washington court to follow the
dictum of its recent opinion in Baun v. Lumber & Sawmill Workers
Union, Local 2740,8 in which it upheld state jurisdiction over a common
law tort action for damages suffered as the result of a union's inter-
ference with a contract of employment, even though the tortious
conduct also constitutes a federal unfair labor practice and is subject
to redress by the NLRB.
And it even forms the basis for an argument that a state lacks power
to reach by injunction union conduct involving threats of violence,
breaches of the peace, etc., e.g., organizational picketing set in such
a context, where it may be subject to an NLRB cease and desist
order.'
0 348 U.S. at 480.
745 Wn.2d 453, 275 P.2d 444 (1954), cert. den., 349 U.S. 915 (1955). Other courts
have followed the Mahoney case. See, for examples, Real v. Curran, 285 App. Div.
522, 138 N.Y. Supp. 2d 809 (1st Dept. 1955) (Court granted reinstatement to union but
refused damages measured by lost wages) ; Sterling v. Local 438, et al .. Md. ........ ,
113 A2d 389 (1955) (Court refused to award damages suffered by expelled plaintiff
as a result of union's efforts to keep him from working in the trade.) But see United
Auto Workers v. Ninz, 218 F.2d 664 (6th Cir., 1955).
8 46 Wn.2d 645, 284 P.2d 275 (1955). The court held that state court jurisdiction is
proper in an action brought on a common law tort theory to recover damages from a
union and certain officers and members thereof suffered as a result of their unlawful
interference with the plaintiff's contract of employment which caused his discharge as
a mill superintendent. (The allegation was that the company fired him in response to
the union's threat to strike if it did not do so.) While the case was clearly distinguish-
able from either the Weber or Mahoney case because it did not appear that the plaintiff,
a supervisory employee, had an NLRB remedy, the court did not stand on that ground
alone. It also upheld state jurisdiction on the ground set forth in the text.9Allen-Bradley Local 111 v. WERB, 315 U.S. 740 (1942), upheld state power to
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However, there are narrowing features of the Weber case. First,
on its facts, the case involves only the situation where there is a
reasonable probability that the conduct, if not prohibited by the Taft-
Hartley Act, is subject to its protection. The Court was heavily influ-
enced by the fact that "even if it were clear that no unfair labor prac-
tices were involved, it would not necessarily follow that the State was
free to issue its injunction. If this conduct does not fall within the
prohibitions of section 8 of the Taft-Hartley Act, it may fall within the
protection of section 7, as concerted activity for mutual aid or pro-
tection."' °
Moreover, the Court, after realizing that "it is not easy for a state
court to decide... whether the subject matter is the concern exclu-
sively of the federal Board... particularly... where the rulings of
the Board are not wholly consistent on the meaning of the sections out-
lawing 'unfair labor practices,' and where the area of free 'concerted
activities' has not been clearly bounded," 11 holds only that:
... [W]here the moving party itself alleges unfair labor practices,
where the facts reasonably bring the controversy within the sections
[of the NLRA] prohibiting these practices, and where the conduct, if
not prohibited by the federal Act, may be reasonably deemed to come
within the protection afforded by that Act, the state court must decline
jurisdiction in deference to the tribunal which Congress has selected
for determining such issues in the first instance.. 2
Second, in both the Garner and Weber cases, the state enjoined
striking or picketing on the basis of a judgment as to its effect on
union organization and collective bargaining. 3 This is the type of
enjoin mass picketing, threats of bodily injury and property damage, obstruction of
streets and public roads, and the blocking of the entrance to a factory. However, since
the decision came down prior to the time the NLRA provided for union unfair labor
practices, no issue of primary jurisdiction was involved. Such conduct was not subject
to regulation by the NLRB, either by prohibtion or protection. The Court's citation
of the Allen-Bradley case with apparent approval in the Garner and Weber cases indi-
cates that such restraints still are excepted from the pre-emption doctrine, and the
recent denial of certiorari in Perez v. Trifiletti, ........ Fla. ......., 74 So.2d 100 (1954),
cert. den., 348 U.S. 926 (1955), lends support to this thesis. (However, although there
was evidence of violence in that case, there was no showing that the picketed employer
whose employees brought the action to enjoin was engaged in interstate business.)
10 348 U.S. at 478, 479.
11348 U.S. at 481.
12 Id.
13 This was true on the face of the decision in the Garner case where the lower state
court enjoined the picketing because its objective was to force the employer to compel
his employees to join the union. As to the state decision in the Weber case, see Cox,
Federalism in Labor Law, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1297, 1327-28 (1954): "The slippery
phrase 'unlawful objective... covers not only (1) the purpose to induce an employer
to engage in unlawful conduct, but also (2) bargaining demands which the employer
may grant without violating any statute or precept of public policy but which the court
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regulation in which conflict between state and federal procedures is
most apt to arise because of the possibility that the NLRB would, if
it had an opportunity to pass on the question, reach a different result.
A Board holding, after appraising striking and picketing for purposes
related to collective bargaining and union organization against the
statutory language setting forth federal policy on such matters, that
the union has not violated the Act does not necessarily mean that the
conduct is sanctioned or protected by federal law. However, it may
be supposed that the Board's determination ordinarily places the
conduct within the area of labor combat designed by federal policy to
be free and upon which the states may not impinge. 4
Thus, the Court relies on the Weber case in its per curiam decision
regards as beyond the required scope of bargaining or insufficient to justify the injury
to the employer's business. Judicial opposition to concerted action in the second
category is not based upon the employees' goal, therefore, but upon concertive action
against the employer as a method of achieving it ... The purpose of NLRA section 7
was to immunize employees against this doctrine."
And at 1329-30: "The [state] decision [in the Weber case] seems inconsistent with
the Garner case.... Every effective strike aimed at spreading union organization...
results in some restraint of trade because it excludes the employer from the market
until he yields. Unless the purpose or effect is to fix the market price to the detriment of
the consumer, the legality of such a restraint depends upon a test of 'reasonableness'...
To judge the reasonableness of the restraint directly involves appraising the union sjustification in terms of the effect on union organization and collective bargaining.
The Anheuser-Busch opinion held the restraint unlawful on this ground.... Where the
underlying issue is made to turn on balancing the interests of employers, employees,
and unions in organizations or collective bargaining, the states should be no more
free to apply anti-trust laws than statutes or court decisions avowedly based upon those
considerations." See Anheuser-Busch v. Weber, 364 Mo. 573, 265 S.W2d 325, 328,
333-34 (1954).
14 "The detailed prescription [in the federal Act] of a procedure for restraint of
specified types of picketing would seem to imply that other picketing is to be free of
other methods and sources of restraint. Garner v. Teamsters, 346 U.S. 485, 499-500(1953). See the discussion of Hanke v. Teamsters, 33 Wn.2d 646, 207 P.2d 206 (1949)
in 30 WAsHa. L. REv. 1, 14. George J. Bott, former NLRB General Counsel, suggested
in a speech to the Ohio State Bar Association Convention, May 21, 1955, that the test
is: Does the conduct at issue fall within a class of activity which Congress considered
in drafting the Taft-Hartley Act?
After the decision in United Automobile Workers (AFL) v. WERB, 336 U. S.
245, 254 (1949), holding that "quickie" strikes are subject to state restraint "because
the Federal Board has no authority either to investigate, approve or forbid" them, and
prior to the dictum in the Garner case, supra, it was widely supposed that the states hadjurisdiction to regulate conduct which is neither protected nor prohibited by the federal
Act. For example, New York, while permitting organizational picketing for the
purpose of inducing the employees to join the union, Wood v. O'Grady, 307 N.Y. 532,
122 N.E.2d 386 (1954), cert den., 319 U. S. 774 (1955), has enjoined picketing for the
purpose of forcing the employer to recognize the union as the exclusive bargaining
representative of his employees in the absence of evidence of its majority status, Good-
wins, Inc. v. Hagedorn, 303 N.Y. 300, 100 N.E2d 697 (1951). The latter decision was
grounded on the theory that state power can be exercised to restrain conduct which
apparently is neither protected by Section 7 nor prohibited by Section 8. The validity
of this theory is doubtful. The Weber case seems to require that a state court dismiss
such a case in deference to the primary jurisdiction of the Board.
Equally doubtful, and for the same reason, is the recent decision in Milwaukee Boston
Store Co. v. American Fed. of Hosiery Workers, 269 Wis. 338, 69 N.W.2d 762 (1955).
The union had a wage dispute with two stocking manufacturers. It engaged in 'products'
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in General Drivers, etc. v. American Tobacco Co.," reversing a deci-
sion of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky which held, after examining
NLRB doctrine, that while a union's picket line did not constitute an
illegal secondary boycott, the state law which obliges common carriers
to provide services to all customers without discrimination required the
union's members who worked for a common carrier to cross the picket
line and handle freight. The Kentucky court reached this result even
though the agreement between the union and the carrier permitted
employees to refuse to cross picket lines.
A state regulation of striking or picketing set in a context of violence
and breaches of the peace is distinguishable on both points. Such
conduct may under some circumstances violate the federal Act, but it
is not protected or sanctioned by it. Moreover, local law lays hold of
it without regard to the defendant's purpose. It is only an irrelevant
happenstance, so far as liability is concerned, that the defendant is a
trade union seeking to strengthen its organization or to strike a bargain
with an employer on some matter.
A related line of analysis supports the dicta of the Washington court
in the Baiun case. Suppose a case where a union, for reasons unre-
lated to collective bargaining or the choice of a bargaining representa-
tive, e.g., his opprobrious criticism of union officials or his efforts
to change union election procedures, has caused an employee to lose
his job or made it impossible for him to get another one, and he brings
an action against it for the common law tort of malicious interference
with his employment and prays for damages."8 While the evidence
picketing at the plaintiff's large retail store which sold these stockings. Finding the
Garner case inapplicable because 'products' picketing, even though secondary in nature,
does not violate the NLRA, the court held that it had jurisdiction to enjoin the conduct.
15348 U.S. 978 (1955), reversing ........ Ky ......... 264 S.W.2d 250 (1954). See also
the Court's decision January 9, 1956, in Local Union No. 25 of Int'l Bro. of Teamsters
etc. v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R. Co.. ........ U.S ......... 76 S. Ct. 227 (1955), reversing
331 Mass. 720, 122 N.E2d 759 (1954), and holding that the state did not have jurisdic-
tion to issue an injunction in an action brought by a rail carrier against a union on the
ground that the latter's picketing in Boston to prevent the former from placing loaded
trailers onto flatcars for "piggy-backing" to other points in New England constituted
a secondary boycott unlawful under both state law and the National Labor Relations
Act. The Court reiterated and relied upon its holding in the Weber case.16 Cf. Mahoney v. Sailors' Union of the Pacific, 45 Wn2d 453, 275 P.2d 440 (1954),
cert. den., 349 U.S. 915 (1955). Mahoney brought his case on the theory that his
expulsion from the union was illegal and had resulted in interference with the property
rights that inhere in union membership, including the right to follow a lawful vocation.
He sought relief by way of an order setting aside his expulsion, directing reinstate-
ment to the union, and awarding damages measured by lost wages. His evidence showed
that he was an employee whose union membership had been terminated for a reason
other than failure to tender periodic dues, and that the union had caused employers to
discriminate against him in order to enforce its discipline. Since such conduct violates
Section 8 (b) (2) of Taft-Hartley, the Washington court held that it lacked jurisdiction
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shows that the plaintiff was not expelled from the union, there is a
reasonable probability that the NLRB, if the case were before it,
would find that the job discrimination was intended to encourage
union membership and adherence to the obligations thereof, and hence
that the defendant had violated section 8 (b) (2) of the federal Act."'
The Weber case does not, on its holding, foreclose the state from
taking jurisdiction over the case. Such conduct, if not prohibited by
the federal Act, cannot reasonably be deemed to be protected or sanc-
tioned by it against state control. The NLRB, might, assuming that
the case were brought to it first, dismiss the complaint on the ground
that the union's conduct was intended only to punish the plaintiff for
his political activities in the union and to discourage other members
from doing likewise." However, such a holding by the Board would
hardly amount to a sanctioning of the union's conduct so as to fore-
close state power to grant the employee a common law remedy in
damages, unless the rather fanciful position were taken that the failure
of the federal Act to regulate the internal affairs of unions manifests
a national labor policy that they are to be free of any regulation. 9
Nor would it seem that such union conduct, since it is not related
to collective bargaining or union organization, is within the protection
of section 7 as a form of concerted activity for mutual aid or pro-
tection.
However, and especially where the evidence seems to show clearly
to award him that item of relief, i.e., back wages, which be could have obtained from
the NLRB.
The Washington court surprisingly fails to mention the Mahoney case in its dictum
in the Baun case. Because of many distinguishing factors it can hardly be supposed
that the latter overrules the former sub silentio. However, in supporting its position
the court followed Kuzma v. Millinery Workers Union, 27 N.J. Super. 579, 99 A.2d
833 (App. Div., 1953), a decision holding that a state has jurisdiction to grant com-
pensatory and punitive damages in tort (wage losses, pain, humiliation, mental and
emotional anguish and distress causing a permanent nerve disability that required
medical care) to a union member who refused to contribute to a gift collection for a
union official, lost her job because the union members refused to work unless the
employer fired her, and was unable to obtain employment from other employers because
of the defendant's conduct. The Washington court, by adopting the doctrine of the
Kuzma case, suggests that it would have taken jurisdiction over Mahoney's claim
arising from the interference with his employment opportunities if he had cast his law
suit in the form suggested in the text.
17 Expulsion from the union is not always an essential element in proving that
Section 8(b) (2) has been violated. See Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U. S.
17 (1954). Cf. Maxon Construction Co., Inc. and Bro. of Painters, etc., No. 437, 112
NLRB No. 62, 36 LRRM 1034 (1955).
'8All of an employee's activities are not protected against job discrimination. For
example, it is not an unfair labor practice for a union to cause an employer to fire an
employee because of his misconduct on the job or his dissemination of Communist
propaganda, even though his discharge was effected following his expulsion from the
union. See Administrative Rulings of NLRB General Counsel, cases Nos. 71 and 72,
March 30, 1951, set out in 27 LRRM 1510.19 See 30 WAsH. L. Rxv. 1, 10, 12 (1955).
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that the union's conduct violated section 8(b) (2), e.g., the fact that
the plaintiff was expelled before his discharge was sought, slips out
during the plaintiff's proofs or is developed by the union in an effort
to defeat state court jurisdiction, the question remains whether the
state may award full compensatory relief, even though the plaintiff
might have received redress from the NLRB for part of his harm,
e.g., back wages." The discussion in the Weber opinion of the Garner
decision and the Court's rejection as immaterial the category of state
public policy upon which the local regulation is based suggest a nega-
tive answer.
However, the Weber case is not squarely in point, and the question
appears to be open where the state remedy, despite partial and fortu-
itous overlapping with the NLRB remedy, is unrelated to the prevention
of unfair labor practices; and where the question of whether it exists
depends upon issues which are ordinarily unimportant to the Board.
While a state court, in determining whether the conduct was tortious,
would have to identify the union's objective and appraise it as a justi-
fication for the infliction of harm on the plaintiff, considerations of
collective bargaining, the free choice of a bargaining representative
by employees, or the strength of union organization against hostile
employers and dual unions-the matters with which the NLRB is
concerned-would be immaterial.2
On the other hand, if the plaintiff alleged unfair labor practices as
the basis for his complaint-viz., grounded the law suit on his expul-
sion from the union and subsequent discrimination in employment,
and prayed for relief which closely paralleled the administrative
remedy which he might obtain from the NLRB, e.g., reinstatement to
employment or an order prohibiting the union from future interference
with his employment, state jurisdiction would doubtless be precluded. 22
20 Mahoney v. Sailors' Union of the Pacific, 45 Wn.2d 453, 275 P.2d 440 (1954), cert.
den., 349 U. S. 915 (1955), is distinguishable from Kuzma v. Millinery Workers Union,
27 N.J. Super. 579, 99 A.2d 833 (App. Div., 1953), upon which the Washington court
relies in the Barn case, because Mahoney was expelled from the union whereas Kuzma
apparently (although the opinion does not say) was not. If the analysis developed in
the text is correct, the distinction should not be controlling.
Nor would it seem to be significant that in Baun the union caused the plaintiff to
lose his job whereas in Mahoney the union made it impossible for the plaintiff to get
a job. The tort is generally recognized as embracing harm caused by malicious inter-
ference with advantageous relations, even though they are prospective, and in Kuzma
the plaintiff complained not only that the union's conduct had cost her a job but also
that it had made it impossible for her to find another one.
21 See Comment, The Sutprene Court, 1954 Term, 69 HARv. L. REv. 119, 177,
179 (1955).
22 However, there would seem to be no objection to giving the plaintiff specific
relief, i.e., reinstatement, upon a showing that his wrongful expulsion from the union
abridged other property rights that attach themselves to membership, e.g., a death
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Probably the best comments on the Weber case are found in the
opinion itself. The Taft-Hartley Act "outlawed some aspects of labor
activities and left others free for the operation of economic forces."
Certain areas have been pre-empted in both categories. Other areas
have been left open for state regulation. The "areas that have been
pre-empted ... are not susceptible of delimitation by fixed metes and
bounds... [and] the Labor Management Relations Act 'leaves much
to the states, though Congress has refrained from telling us how much.'
This penumbral area can be rendered progressively clear only by the
course of litigation."'2
Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros.2
An issue related to the Garner and Weber cases arises when a state
court issues an injunction against conduct which apparently is either
prohibited or protected by the NLRA, and either the NLRB or the
enjoined party seeks a federal decree staying its enforcement.
During the 1953-54 term the Supreme Court, in Capital Service,
Inc. v. NLRB, 5 sustained the issuance of such relief under the excep-
tion to the prohibition of 28 U.S.C. § 2283 permitting a federal court
to enjoin where "necessary in aid of its jurisdiction." However, on
its facts the decision was limited to the situation where the NLRB
had issued a complaint against the conduct which was the subject of
the state decree and had successfully sought interlocutory federal
relief under section 10 (1) of Taft-Hartley.
Dicta of the opinion suggested that such a result would follow in
any situation where the NLRB had taken jurisdiction of the case and
was the moving party.2"
The Capital Service case left open the question of whether the
federal courts have such power where the NLRB has not issued a
complaint and relief is sought by the party against whom the state
court proceedings have been brought-viz., whether a federal district
court may enjoin an intrusion on the exclusive federal domain apart
from the specific exceptions of section 2283. The Supreme Court
benefit, provided that the decree was formulated so as to protect these rights only.
Ordering reinstatement with all rights and privileges of membership as a means of
jforcing the union to cease the unfair labor practice would, of course, run afoul of the
pre-emption doctrines. See Mahoney v. Sailors' Union of the Pacific, 45 Wn.2d 453,
461-465, 275 P.2d 440, 445-447 (1954).
23 348 U.S. at 480-81.
24348 U.S. 511 (1955).
26347 U.S. 501 (1954).
26 See NLRB v. NYSLRB, 106 F. Supp. 749 (S.D., N.Y., 1952). Compare Intl.
Union of Electrical, etc. Workers (CIO) v. Underwood Corp., 219 F.2d 100 (2nd
Cir., 1955).
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gave a negative answer during the 1954-55 term in the Richman
Brothers case, an action brought by a union to enjoin a corporation
from further prosecution of its suit in state court against peaceful
picketing. The Court also held that the exception to section 2283
which had been the basis for the decision in the Capital Service was
inapplicable, as was the exception permitting a federal injunction to
issue "as expressly authorized by act of Congress," for Taft-Hartley
does not authorize private litigants to apply for such relief. The union's
remedy is to appeal the state court decision.
Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp2 7
The most important single issue arising under section 301 of Taft-
Hartey is whether it merely provides a forum in which actions for
breach of a collective bargaining agreement between an employer and
a union may conveniently be brought or whether it also makes the
parties federally liable for any loss, damage, or injury caused by a
breach. Considerations of constitutionality push toward the latter
interpretation, but legislative history seems to support the former.
Moreover, a substantive interpretation of section 301 creates serious
problems with respect to the applicability of state law to collective
agreements in industries affecting commerce. It raises doubts as to
the jurisdiction of state courts to enforce such agreements; and it may
make a cause of action for breach removable even though it purports to
be grounded entirely on state law and the federal courts lack jurisdic-
tion to give the relief sought, e.g., an injunction or specific performance
of a promise to arbitrate. 8
The question of the interpretation of section 301 was before the
Supreme Court last term in the Westinghouse case, but the Court
managed to dispose of the case on other grounds.
The case involved an action brought by a union under section 301
seeking a declaratory judgment that the collective agreement required
the employer to pay some 4,000 employees for a particular day on
which they did not work and a judgment for damages running in favor
of the employees so entitled. The district court dismissed the complaint
on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action.29
The majority of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed
the dismissal, in a four to three decision, but on the ground that back
27348 U.S. 437 (1955).
28 See 30 WASH. L. REv. 1, 20-23 (1955).
29107 F. Supp. 692 (W.D. Pa., 1952).
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wage claims arise out of the employee's individual contracts of employ-
ment, not the collective bargaining agreement, and hence are not
within federal court jurisdiction under section 301. The dissenting
judges thought that the claim arose out of the collective agreement and
that the union had a sufficient justiciable interest to be entitled to
whatever remedy was necessary in order to protect group interests. 0
Both the majority and the minority conceived of section 301 as
creating a federal substantive right to enforce the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement. And both applied federal law in resolving the
substantive issue-viz., do the wage terms of a collective bargaining
agreement create rights enforceable by the union which is a party to
it? They differed only in their notions of the applicable federal rule.
The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal in a six to two decision,
Justices Warren and Clark joining in a brief concurring opinion, Mr.
Justice Reed filing a separate concurring opinion, and Justices Douglas
and Black dissenting in an opinion written by the former.
The judgment of the Court, announced in an opinion written by
Mr. Justice Frankfurter (joined by Justices Burton and Minton),
avoids the issue of whether section 301 is substantive or procedural,
The opinion reasons on the basis of the language of the section and its
legislative history that the latter interpretation is correct, with state
substantive law governing enforcement of the contract.
However, Mr. Justice Frankfurter doubts that such an interpreta-
tion could survive constitutional attack because federal court jurisdic-
tion over non-diversity cases can properly lie only when the case arises
under a law of the United States, that is, when some aspect of federal
law is essential to the plaintiff's success. Under broader federal ques-
tion theory the "arising under" requirement of article III of the
Constitution is satisfied if there is a contingent likelihood that a federal
question will be presented, and a jurisdictional view of section 301
meets this test because there is always the possibility that the validity
of the collective bargaining agreement will be challenged on federal
grounds, e.g., the union was not the representative of the employees
involved. This would be enough, by analogy to situations involving
federal corporations and trustees in bankruptcy, but Mr. Justice
Frankfurter doubts that these precedents could be extended to meet
the substantial difficulties encountered under section 301.
Since a substantive interpretation is at war with the statutory lan-
guage and a jurisdictional interpretation raises serious questions of
-0 210 F2d 623 (3rd Cir., 1954).
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constitutional validity, the opinion follows the "orthodox process of
limiting the scope of doubtful legislation," 1 and holds simply that
Congress did not intend to burden the federal courts with suits based
upon an employer's failure to comply with terms relating to compen-
sation-terms peculiar in the individual benefit which is their subject
matter.
Justices Warren and Clark agree with this conclusion, but give no
clue as to whether they think section 301 is substantive or procedural.82
Mr. Justice Reed, on the other hand, while reaching the same result,
adopts substantially the position of the majority of Third Circuit 3-
viz., that section 301 is substantive but that an employer's duty to pay
wages to an employee arises from the individual contract of employ-
ment, not from the collective bargaining agreement.
Justices Douglas and Black also view section 301 as substantive,"
the applicable federal rules for the construction and interpretation of
agreements being drawn from federal statutes, state law, and other
germane sources. But they argue that, by analogy to the NLRA, a
union has standing under federal law not only to secure the employer's
promises but also to enforce them, by law suit or otherwise.
While the Westinghouse decision leaves the basic issue for determina-
tion in another case, it makes the position of six members of the Court
reasonably clear, leaving Justices Warren, Clark, and Harlan to decide
the question. The decision also makes it clear that, no matter what
interpretation section 301 is ultimately given, the states are free to
enforce claims brought by individual employees based upon violations
of the terms of the agreement that relate to compensation. Presum-
ably this includes not only wage terms but all other compensation
terms that are peculiar in the individual benefit which is their subject
matter.85 Indeed, it would seem that the states may permit a union to
bring such an action."8
31348 U.S. at 459.
32 348 U.S. at 461.
3 348 U.S. at 461-465.
3 348 U.S. at 465-468.
35 See Int'l Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union v. Libby, McNeill & Libby,
221 F.2d 225 (9th Cir., 1955) (Action by union against employer for back wages owed
an employee who allegedly was discharged wrongfully; dismissed on authority of West-
inghouse case.)386 Compare Textile Workers Union et al. v. Textron, Inc.. ........ N.H ......... 111
A2d 823 (1955) (action by union against employer to recover back wages due numer-
ous former employees for work performed by them; held that union may bring a bill in
equity on behalf of the union members in the name of the business agent).
For a more extensive discussion of the Westinghouse case and the question of
whether Section 301 is substantive or procedural, see Wollett and Wellington, Federal-
ism and Breach of the Labor Agreement, 7 STAN. L. Ray. 445 (1955).
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